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ABSTRACT
Niko Kolodny makes the following claims. Claim 1: We don’t have reason, in general, to 
comply with rational requirements for their own sake. Claim 2: Even if we do have 
reason to comply with rational requirements, in general, and, for their own sake, it 
doesn’t follow that we have that same reason in any particular case. In this paper, I argue 
that both Claim 1 and Claim 2 are false. I provide a novel argument which explains why 
we have reason to comply with rational requirements (for their own sake) both in general, 
and in particular cases. Along the way I offer my own theory of achievements and defend 
it against objections. The general structure of my argument looks like this:
The Value Argument
P1: If doing something would constitute something of (at least) pro tanto 
final value (where ‘final’ just means ‘valuable for its own sake’ and, thus, 
not merely instrumentally valuable), then that is, ceteris paribus, a reason 
to do it.
P2: Being subjectively rational (i.e. complying with rational requirements) 
is an achievement.
P3: Achievements have pro tanto final value.
Therefore, we have reason to be subjectively rational, for its own sake, 
both in general, and in particular cases.
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 4
Why We Have An Intrinsic 
Reason To Be Rational
Introduction
I agree with Niko Kolodny that one is subjectively rational on some occasion when one 
complies with rational requirements on that occasion (Kolodny, 516)1. But what rational 
requirements are there? In this paper, I will understand rational requirements to include, 
but not be limited to, the following:
Belief Consistency - The requirement not to believe that p if you believe 
that not-p. 
Instrumental Rationality - The requirement to intend to φ if you believe 
that φ-ing is a necessary means to something else you intend.
Enkrasia - The requirement to intend to φ if you believe you ought to φ. 
Intention Coherence - The requirement not to intend to φ if you intend not 
to φ.
Belief Closure - The requirement to believe that q if you believe that if p 
then q and believe that p. 
  Kolodny thinks there is no intrinsic reason to be subjectively rational.2 That is, he 
thinks we don’t have reason to be subjectively rational for its own sake. Kolodny claims 
that “We can contrive situations...in which people have instrumental reasons for avoiding 
irrationality” but “One would not comply with rational requirements for their own sake, 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 5
1 All Kolodny citations are from his 2005.
2 I use the phrases “subjective rationality”, “practical rationality”, and the term “rationality” synonymously.
When Kolodny uses the phrase “intrinsic reason” he means something like a reason to do, pursue, or care 
about, something for its own sake. For example, he says, “[The potential problem of losing one’s status as 
an agent or believer when one is, in a single instance, irrational] would not arise, of course, if our reason for 
complying with rational requirements were an intrinsic reason, a reason to avoid irrationality for its own 
sake” (544, emphasis added). Jason Bridges also takes Kolodny in this way. See his “Rationality, 
Normativity, and Transparency” in Mind 118 (2009): 353-367.
[one would comply only] because doing so brought about something for which one has 
independent reasons” (Kolodny,543). Kolodny’s claim is that we have no reason to 
comply with rational requirements for their own sake. He thinks that this is true both in 
general and in particular cases.3 For example, he says, “...there is ground for doubting 
that there are reasons to comply with any rational requirements. If there were reasons to 
comply with rational requirements, what would they be?” (Kolodny, 542) He continues,
Rationality is normative for any believer or intender, no matter what his 
circumstances. If its normativity consists in reason to conform to rational 
requirements, then this reason must be more general (Kolodny, 543. 
Emphasis added).4
He goes further when he suggests,
...if it is true that we have [a] reason to comply with rational requirements 
as a rule, it does not follow that we have this reason to comply with them 
in any particular case. When we say that someone ‘ought rationally’ to 
have an attitude, we are saying something about what ‘ought’ to happen 
here and now (Kolodny,543).
Basically, Kolodny makes the following claims. 
Claim 1: We don’t have reason, in general, to comply with rational 
requirements for their own sake. 
Claim 2: Even if we do have reason to comply with rational requirements, 
in general, and, for their own sake, it doesn’t follow that we have that 
same reason in any particular case. 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 6
3 When Kolodny claims that we don’t, “as a rule” (pg. 543) or, in general, have an intrinsic reason to be 
rational, I take him to mean that in most cases we don’t have an intrinsic reason to be rational and even if 
we did have such a reason to be rational in most cases it doesn’t follow that we would have that same 
reason in every case. That is, there will be particular instances in which one could be rational but would 
have no intrinsic reason to be rational.
4 Kolodny sometimes refers to rationality as normative when he really means that it is only apparently 
normative. Nicholas Southwood notes the same obscurity in Kolodny’s writing. See Southwood’s (2008) 
page 13.
In what follows I will argue that both Claim 1 and Claim 2 are false. I provide a novel 
argument that explains why we have intrinsic reason to be subjectively rational both, in 
general, and in particular cases.5 The general structure of my argument looks like this:
The Value Argument
P1: If doing something would constitute something of (at least) pro tanto 
final value (where ‘final’ just means ‘valuable for its own sake’ and, thus, 
not merely instrumentally valuable), then that is, ceteris paribus, a reason 
to do it.
P2: Being subjectively rational (i.e. complying with rational requirements) 
is an achievement.6
P3: Achievements have pro tanto final value.
Therefore, we have reason to be subjectively rational, for its own sake, 
both in general, and in particular cases.
Valuable Things Give Us Reasons (Defense of P1)
It is widely accepted that reasons are provided (or, explained) by facts about value. 7 That 
is, something being valuable can give us a reason to care about or pursue it. Further, I 
take it that P1 has strong intuitive appeal and, as such, is mostly uncontroversial. It is 
plausible that Kolodny would himself find P1 uncontroversial. He says,
[The problem of one losing one’s status as an agent or believer because 
one is, in a single instance, irrational] would not arise, of course, if our 
reason for complying with rational requirements were an intrinsic reason, 
a reason to avoid irrationality for its own sake. That would be a reason to 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 7
5 While Kolodny provides various arguments in favor of Claim 1 and Claim 2, I won’t recount those here. 
This is because my response to Kolodny doesn’t depend on the reasons he provides in favor of Claim 1 and 
Claim 2.
6 In order to head-off a potential objection, I am assuming, with Kolodny, that in order for one to 
“rationally” resolve a conflict in one’s attitudes and, thus, be subjectively rational, one must actually reason 
in some “[b]road, but recognizable sense of reason...” (Kolodny, 520). So, one couldn’t comply with 
rational requirements in just any way and still be said to be subjectively rational. Thanks to Jeff Behrends 
for convincing me to address this worry.
7 Philosophers such as Derek Parfit (2011), Joseph Raz (2002), and Thomas Scanlon (1998) have argued, in 
one way or another, that reasons are provided by facts about value. Theories of reasons which suggest that 
reasons are provided (or explained) by value are commonly referred to as objectivist theories of reasons. 
Subjectivist theories of reasons suggest that reasons are provided (or explained) by an agent’s desires. 
comply with each and every rational requirement. But is there such a 
reason? We have intrinsic reasons to care about persons, relationships, 
justice, art, science, the natural environment, and so on, for their own sake. 
All of that is familiar enough. But is being subjectively rational another 
substantive value that we actually weigh against these others? (Kolodny, 
544-45)
As Kolodny clearly implies, a plausible way to account for the reason we have to create 
works of art, exact justice, care about persons, relationships and so on is because those 
things are valuable. However, he doubts that being subjectively rational is a valuable kind 
of thing on a par with the other things listed. While Kolodny suggests that the things he 
lists are of substantive value8, it is plausible that at least some of the things on his list 
(e.g. relationships, persons, art and so on) are valuable for their own sake and because of 
this provide us an intrinsic reason to pursue or care about them.
 Kolodny explicitly claims that something being valuable does give us a reason to 
pursue (and care about) that thing. For example, he imagines that one might say, “...if 
[being subjectively rational] is valuable, then we have a reason not only to preserve it, but 
also to manifest it whenever the opportunity presents itself.” In response to this, he says, 
if plausible, this claim “would be of the right kind. It would give us a reason to comply 
with each and every rational requirement” (Kolodny, 545).
 My Value Argument is precisely the kind of argument that Kolodny thinks could 
work to show that we have an intrinsic reason to be subjectively rational. This is because, 
as I will argue, subjective rationality is an achievement and, as such, is valuable for its 
own sake. This means that we have an intrinsic reason to pursue (or care about) 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 8
8 According to Kolodny, in order for something to be of substantive value it must “prevent suffering or 
expand the frontiers of knowledge” (Kolodny, 545-546). So, I understand substantive value to be a species 
of instrumental value as opposed to final value. I’ll say more about the distinction between instrumental 
and final value later.
subjective rationality. Subjective rationality is itself a valuable kind of thing in the world 
because it is an instance of a more general valuable kind—it’s an achievement.
 Of course, the value of any of the things mentioned above can be defeated. After 
all, presumably there is more than one thing in the world with final value and, again, 
presumably, we care about more than just one thing. For example, the value of creating a 
work of art, and the reason one has to create that work of art can be outweighed by 
reasons not to create it. Maybe the resources involved in creating that particular work of 
art could be used to alleviate the suffering of an innocent person. In that situation, 
creating the work of art may have some value, and one might, on account of that value 
have some reason—in a very insignificant sense of “reason”—to create it.9 However, the 
value of the work of art and one’s reason to create it is obviously outweighed by the value 
of alleviating the suffering of an innocent person.
 All of this is plausible. So, I will now move to discuss the nature of achievements 
and their value.
Achievements and Their Value (Defense of P3)
It’s clear that we value achievements. All else being equal, we would prefer a life marked 
by achievements over a life marked by lucky success. But just what is an achievement? 
And what kind of value do achievements have? In this section I set out to answer both of 
these questions. I then apply the relevant insights to subjective rationality. 
 Greco on Achievements. John Greco says that an achievement is a success 
because of one’s relevant abilities (Greco, 2010). The phrase “because of” designates a 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 9
9 I’m in agreement with Mark Schroeder that reasons can have more or less weight. For more on this see 
his 2007, page 94. 
causal explanation. That is, when one is said to experience an achievement one’s relevant 
abilities are a salient causal feature in the production of that achievement. For example, 
Smith can’t achieve hitting the game winning shot unless he has basketball abilities. He 
may hit the game winning shot without basketball abilities—say, because of luck—but 
we won’t call his hitting the shot an achievement unless we can also attribute to him 
basketball abilities which are causally responsible for his hitting the game winning shot. 
The idea is that one’s abilities being a salient causal explanation of one’s success helps 
avoid the charge that one’s success was the product of luck.
 Further, when we say that someone achieved x, we’re making a credit attribution. 
And a plausible way to account for whether or not one deserves to be given credit for 
achieving x, is to determine whether or not x was produced by the agent’s relevant 
abilities. If x wasn’t produced by the agent’s relevant abilities then it’s hard to see how x 
wasn’t just the product of luck. And, intuitively, achievements are incompatible with 
luck.10
 Objection. Greco’s account of achievements is not without its problems. For 
example, it isn’t clear what Greco means by “success”. So, in this way, his account is 
vague. Does “success” mean meeting one’s goals? Or is it simply producing an end one 
intended? Or does it mean something else? Greco never says.11
 Duncan Pritchard has understood Greco’s use of “success” in a broad sense. That 
is, Pritchard takes Greco to mean something like producing what one intends to do at a 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 10
10 There is a kind of luck (e.g. environmental luck) that seems to be compatible with achievements. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss that here. For more on this see Duncan Pritchard’s 
2010.
11 While the distinction between one’s intentions and one’s goals isn’t abundantly clear, I think the notion is 
clear enough to forego saying anything else about it here.
particular time (Pritchard, 2010, p. 22). This broad understanding of “success” causes 
problems for Greco’s account of achievements because it entails the counterintuitive 
conclusion that for a normally functioning human being, in normal circumstances, 
scratching one’s nose is an achievement.
 A refinement and an objection. One might attempt to avoid this problem by 
suggesting that a necessary condition of any achievement is that it be difficult (James, 
2005; Bradford 2007).12 If this is right then scratching one’s nose won’t be an 
achievement. After all, when in normal circumstances, it isn’t difficult for a normally 
functioning human to scratch her nose.  However, while difficulty may contribute to the 
value of an achievement qua achievement, it doesn’t follow that difficulty is a necessary 
condition of achievements. Presumably, it wasn’t difficult for God to create the world. 
And if anything gets to count as an achievement, surely the creation of the world counts. 
In fact, it might be the most impressive achievement of all achievements.
 If you don’t like the God case, consider a situation in which Smith, a human being 
with impressive intellectual powers discovers a cure for cancer with ease. It would be 
absurd to say that he didn’t achieve something when he discovered the cure for cancer.13
 If Smith’s case is still too fanciful, consider the following cases from Pritchard. 
[W]hen Tiger Woods sinks a putt with ease, or when Rafael Nadal hits a 
winning shot with no trouble at all, we would certainly regard the 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 11
12 To be more precise, James thinks that achievements which can contribute to the meaningfulness of one’s 
life must be difficult. I think this idea is mistaken. After all, becoming a productive member of society is, 
for most of us, pretty easy. Even if we face some adversity, we aren’t naturally disposed to do things that 
would disqualify us as being productive members of society. That is, we don’t have to work hard to attain 
to, or keep, the status productive member of society. But surely being a productive member of society is an 
achievement that can contribute to the meaning of one’s life. It’s the sort of status that can be appealed to in 
order to encourage one who is in a state of mellon collie and so on.
13 Thanks to John Fraiser for suggesting this particular case.
successes in question as achievements, even though they are, for them at 
least, easy successes (Pritchard, 2010, 22).
Further, one can imagine that it was easy for Michael Jordan to dunk a basketball after 
jumping from the free-throw line. It’s seems intuitively plausible that Jordan has, in this 
case, achieved something. But if this is right, difficulty isn’t a necessary condition of 
achievements. However, one might object that Jordan’s case shows that difficulty is 
required for achievements because Jordan worked hard and spent many years in difficult 
training so that he could dunk a basketball after jumping from the free-throw line.
 In Jordan’s case (as well as the other cases) there are actually two achievements 
with which he can be credited. The first is something like achieving the status being a 
premier basketball player while the other achievement is dunking the basketball after 
jumping from the free-throw line. Ordinarily, we don’t just credit Jordan with achieving 
the status premier basketball player (although he is that); we also credit him with 
achieving particular exercises of his abilities even when those exercise and the outcomes 
they produce aren’t difficult for him. So, while we might indeed say Jordan has achieved 
something that is difficult to achieve, namely, achieving the status premier basketball 
player, we don’t, on account that fact, require that every achievement be difficult.
 Still further, many normally functioning people in the United States have 
graduated from kindergarten and didn’t have to put much effort into it. That is, graduating 
kindergarten was, for most of us, pretty easy. However, many of us had parents who 
congratulated us and told us that we had really achieved something. And, if they were 
being sincere in their congratulatory remarks—and I think we have no good reason to 
think otherwise—then it seems clear enough that not all achievements are difficult.
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 12
 A New and Improved Account of Achievements. What we need is an account of 
achievements that doesn’t entail the counterintuitive conclusion that scratching one’s 
nose is, normally, an achievement, and, further, we need an account that doesn’t require 
difficulty as a necessary condition of achievements since, as we have seen, not all 
achievements are difficult. Further, the account must not be ad hoc. I offer the following 
account of achievements which succeeds in all of these respects.
Achievement - An achievement is a success-through-ability where 
“success” means meeting (or having met) appropriate personal and/or 
societal goals (or expectations).
“Appropriate” as it relates to goals means: goals which don’t require one (or, the 
members of a group) to flout one’s (or, their) moral duties or act imprudently. To be 
imprudent can include, but is not limited to, being foolish or silly (in a very 
commonsensical sense of those terms), not providing for one’s future well being, and so 
on. A personal goal is a goal (or expectation) one sets for oneself and a societal goal is a 
goal (or expectation) that most members of a society place on other members of their 
society. So, on Achievement, one experiences an achievement just in case one meets 
appropriate personal and/or societal goals because of one’s relevant abilities and the goals 
in question aren’t immoral goals nor are they imprudent.
 There are at least four virtues of this account of achievements. First, it reflects 
how we often talk about achievements. For example, we often say things like, “Jones 
achieved his goals” or, “Jones achieved what was expected of him.” So, in this way, 
Achievement reflects natural language and is, therefore, not ad hoc. Second, Achievement 
doesn’t entail that scratching one’s nose is, in normal circumstances, an achievement. 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 13
This is because we (normally functioning humans) don’t normally set as a goal to scratch 
noses and even if we did, it would be imprudent to do so. Intuitively, it just is silly for a 
normally functioning person to set as a goal scratch nose.14 We do regularly intend to 
scratch our noses but this isn’t the same thing as setting as a goal scratch nose.15 Third, it 
gives us the right result in the case of easy achievements. For example, God’s creating the 
world is an achievement for God because, we can imagine, he set as a goal to create the 
world and met that goal by way of his relevant abilities. The same is also true of the other 
cases of easy achievements considered above. For example, one’s graduating 
kindergarten counts as an achievement because it is a goal or expectation placed on one 
by society.16
 Lastly, we naturally use the term “achievement” as a term of praise and 
appreciation. That is, when we think about achievements we think about praising the one 
credited with the achievement or appreciating something that one has done. So, 
Achievement captures what we want the concept of achievements to do for us by bringing 
to light the fact that the goals involved in any achievement must be appropriate goals.17 
So, again, in this way it is not ad hoc. One further consequence of the appropriate goals 
requirement is that there are no, so called, “evil achievements”. We simply don’t praise 
individuals (or a society) for being immoral even if they set as their goal to be immoral.
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 14
14 This does not entail that it would be imprudent for a person recovering from a severe accident to set as a 
goal scratch nose. For someone in that kind of situation it would not be imprudent to set as a goal scratch 
nose. 
15 See footnote 11.
16 And in those cases in which kindergarten-aged children set as their goal to graduate kindergarten, it 
counts as an achievement of a personal goal and societal goal.
17 Thanks to Waldemar Rohloff for a conversation about the nature of happiness which encouraged me to 
continue to pursue this line of thought.
 Objection. One might object that Achievement gets us the wrong result in some 
cases and, thus, fails as an adequate account of achievements. For example, imagine a 
situation in which a society doesn’t have it as a goal to protect the civil liberties of its 
citizens. But now imagine that Jones sets as his goal raise awareness about unjust 
violations of civil liberties. Further, imagine that Jones meets his goal by way of his 
relevant abilities. It seems clear enough that Jones has achieved something in this 
situation. However, since Jones’s society doesn’t have it as a goal to protect civil liberties 
or raise awareness about how it is unjust not to protect them, then, given Achievement, 
Jones hasn’t achieved anything. So, Achievement gives us the wrong result in Jones’s 
case and cases like it.18
 Response. It isn’t clear that Achievement gives us the wrong result in Jones’s case. 
While Jones can’t be credited with achieving a goal society set for him, it isn’t right to 
say that he hasn’t achieved something. Jones’s achievement is, clearly, a personal 
achievement because he met, by way of his relevant abilities, an appropriate goal he set 
for himself. 
 While a more fully developed account of achievements is desirable and might 
include a list of what particular goals count as appropriate goals as well as a theory about 
how to weight personal and societal goals for purposes of deliberation and action, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to explore these issues. The goal here has been to provide 
an intuitively plausible account of achievements which deals with (at least) some hard 
cases.
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 15
18 Thanks to John Brunero for raising this concern.
 Now that I have said something about the nature of achievements, I will move to 
discuss the value of achievements.
 The Value of Achievements. In almost any enterprise where success is possible, we 
make a distinction between success that comes by way of ability and mere lucky success. 
And, intuitively, success (as defined above) that comes by way of (i.e., is caused by) 
one’s relevant abilities is more valuable than success that comes by way of luck. I think 
this idea holds strong intuitive appeal. But before I say more about it, it will be useful to 
say something about the term “value”.
 Whenever we talk about the value of something we need to ask what we mean by 
“value”. I will distinguish between two types of value: final value and instrumental value. 
Something has final value if it is valuable for its own sake. Something is instrumentally 
valuable if it is valuable for some other end. That there is a distinction between these two 
kinds of value doesn’t entail that the same object (or state of affairs) cannot have both 
final and instrumental value. I’ll say more about this later. In the meantime, a couple of 
examples are in order.
 When a son asks his father why he must get a job, his father may reply, “Because 
you need to be a productive member of society and take care of yourself.” One might 
imagine a son stricken by laziness asking, “But why should I take care of myself?” The 
son may continue with questions like this. But at some point the father’s responses 
terminate in some final end. He might respond with, “Because taking care of yourself just 
is valuable—that’s just what you need to do!” In this situation, the father is suggesting 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 16
that taking care of oneself has final value; it is valuable for its own sake—there is no 
other instrumental reason that can be given to account for its worth.
 Imagine another scenario. Pete’s high school basketball team is playing in the 
state tournament and desperately needs a win in order to avoid being eliminated. We 
could imagine that to Pete and his teammates, hitting the game-winning shot is not 
valuable for its own sake. It is only valuable inasmuch as it keeps them from being 
eliminated from the tournament—he (nor his team) cares whether the shot is produced by  
luck or skill. That is, it is only instrumentally valuable to them.
 Some of the time one won’t care how one experiences some success. For 
example, if Smith were in desperate need of money he might not care if he received a 
promotion at work because of his relevant abilities or because of luck. However, it seems 
to me that most of the time, most of us do care about how we arrive at our successes. All 
other things being equal, we would want to receive a promotion at work because our 
relevant abilities set us apart from the other applicants and not merely because the boss 
drew names out of a hat or happened to think we were attractive. This suggests that that 
achievements have final value—they are valuable for their own sake.
 The fact that something is valuable for its own sake doesn’t mean that that same 
thing isn’t also instrumentally valuable. Imagine that I set as my goal to get a promotion 
at work and my primary motivation is that it will bring me more money. It is in this way 
instrumentally valuable to me. There are two ways I can get the promotion—via my 
relevant abilities or via luck. Now imagine that God tells me that I will get the promotion 
no matter what. Since he’s being extra nice today he gives me the choice to get the 
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promotion through lucky means or, alternatively, through my relevant abilities. It seems 
to me that I would, all else being equal, choose the second option—and this despite the 
fact that I primarily want the promotion so that I make more money. If I’m going to get it 
either way, I want to get it through my abilities—I want to achieve it. Since the 
instrumental value of the God-given options is equal, the only thing left to say is that 
achieving the promotion has final value—it’s valuable for its own sake.
 Imagine the case this way. I set as my goal to get a promotion at work because 
I’m in desperate need of money. I may not, at first, care how I get the promotion—luck or 
ability, it doesn’t matter to me. Now imagine that I get it because of my abilities. It seems 
right that I should, all else being equal, look back on the situation and say something like, 
“I didn’t try to get the promotion because it was an achievement. However, now that I’m 
reflecting on it and see that it’s an achievement, it’s all the more valuable—I wouldn’t 
have it any other way.”
 In this situation, the state (or, process) being promoted turns into an achievement 
because of the way I interact with it. If it’s a goal of mine (or, one placed on me by 
society) and my abilities are a salient causal feature in bringing it about, it’s an 
achievement. If they’re not, it’s simply a lucky success. That is, it changes into a different 
kind of thing—namely, an achievement—than it would otherwise be (i.e. a mere lucky 
success) were it not a goal and my abilities not responsible for me meeting that goal. And 
when this change in kind occurs, a new kind of value accrues to the state (or, process) 
being promoted. As an achievement, being promoted is valuable for its own sake—it 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 18
turns into the kind of thing we intuitively find ourselves caring about for its own sake. 
But this hardly means that it loses its instrumental value of bringing me more money.
 There is one last thing to note about the value of achievements. The final value of 
achievements is pro tanto in character. As I mentioned earlier, achieving creating a 
particular work of art might have final value but that value might be outweighed because 
of certain features of creating that work of art. For example, maybe the resources 
involved in creating that particular work of art could be used to alleviate the suffering of 
an innocent person. Situations like this suggest that the value of achievements can be 
outweighed.
Subjective Rationality is an Achievement (Defense of P2)
Now that I have said something about the nature and value of achievements, my goal in 
this section will be to show that subjective rationality is an achievement (on 
Achievement) and, as such, has final value. This is important because if subjective 
rationality is a valuable kind of thing then we have a reason to be rational for its own sake
—we have a reason to be rational precisely because of the kind of thing rationality is.
 Complying with rational requirements necessarily involves one forming beliefs 
and intentions as well as making logical inferences based on one’s beliefs. Clearly, 
forming beliefs and intentions as well as making logical inferences involves the exercise 
of our cognitive abilities. I take this point to be uncontroversial. If cognitive abilities 
aren’t the abilities at play in forming beliefs and intentions and making inferences it isn’t 
clear what other kinds of abilities might play this role. So, I conclude that practical 
rationality involves at least the exercise of one’s cognitive abilities. 
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 I say “at least” because one might also be inclined to say that one’s will is an 
ability that is involved in practical reasoning. According to John Broome, at least one 
rational requirement is the enkrasia requirement: the requirement to intend to x if you 
believe you ought to x. We sometimes talk as if the will is something we can get better or 
worse at controlling and exercising. If this is right, then one might consider the will to be 
an ability, of one kind or another, involved in practical rationality. Whether or not one’s 
will is a cognitive ability is, in my mind, an open question—I take no position on that 
issue here. Further, one might insist, as did Aristotle, that all practical reasoning must 
culminate in some physical (i.e. non-mental) action.19 If this is right, practical reasoning 
will rightly be said to involve more than one’s cognitive abilities—it will also involve 
one’s physical abilities. Whether or not this view is correct is something I won’t consider 
here.
 Since it’s obvious that (at least) one’s cognitive abilities necessarily play some 
causal role in whether or not one is subjectively rational20, this means that one of the 
necessary conditions of Achievement is met (i.e. the through ability condition). But now I 
need to say something about the other necessary condition of Achievement (i.e. the 
appropriate goal condition). I will first establish that subjective rationality is both a 
personal and societal goal and then briefly say something about whether or not it is an 
appropriate goal.
 According to Eldar Sharif and Robyn LeBoeuf, we have it as a goal (or, expect) 
for others to be rational. For example, they say,
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19 For more on this see John Broome’s, 2001.
20 See footnote 6.
Apart from those theories [constructed by social scientists] that are about 
idealized rationality rather than about possible human achievement (see, 
e.g. Stalnaker 1984, Gardenfors 1988), the requirements of rationality 
typically imposed are those that we expect people, at least to a first 
approximation, to be able to fulfill (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002, 492).21
Nicholas Southwood notes that there is, “[F]rom a third-personal perspective [a] pressure 
to hold others to account in respect of rational requirements to which they are subject, 
and to regard those who violate them as appropriate objects of criticism” (Southwood, 
2008, 12). For example, imagine that we are aware that Jane intends to go to medical 
school and believes that it is necessary to take the MCAT in order to get into medical 
school but never intends to take the MCAT. No doubt in this situation we recognize that 
something has gone wrong with Jane that we would rather not see go wrong. All other 
things being equal, we expect Jane to intend what she believes to be a necessary means to 
something else she intends and so on. And when she doesn’t, we recognize that she’s 
failed to meet this goal (or expectation). That we have it as a goal for others to be rational 
holds strong intuitive and experiential appeal.
 Further, subjective rationality is often a goal of both formal and informal 
education. I believe this shows that subjective rationality is a fundamental goal (or 
expectation) we have for other human beings in our society in particular and in the world 
more generally. Take for example rational requirements for one to believe what follows 
by modus ponens and other things one believes, the requirement for one to believe what 
one has conclusive evidence to believe, to not believe p if one believes that not-p, and so 
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rationality) with contents that are true. They say, “It is notable that the predominant theories of rationality 
are predicated on notions of consistency, not of substance. A person is entitled to a wide range of opinions, 
beliefs, and preferences; what is important is for these to cohere in a normatively defensible 
fashion” (2002, 492).
on. Many of us teach introductory logic students to reason using valid inference forms 
such as modus ponens and we discuss the importance of forming beliefs in accord with 
the evidence one has and so on. And we don’t just set it as a goal that our students reason 
this way in the classroom, we want them to take these reasoning skills with them and 
reason this way in everyday situations with other people.
 Children often begin to learn to comply with rational requirements well before 
their formal education begins. For example, a father trying to teach his young daughter to 
be subjectively rational might try to get her to understand that if she intends to get some 
milk then she will, in circumstances in which no one else will get the milk for her, have 
to stop playing in order to get the milk. In this case, the father’s goal might be to teach his 
daughter to intend what she believes to be a necessary means to something else she 
intends or to intend what she has reason to intend.
 Lastly, almost no one says to him/herself, “I want to be irrational. It’s a goal of 
mine.” In fact, most of us, at one time or another, have thought the exact opposite. Most 
of us, at least implicitly, set it as a goal (or place on ourselves the expectation) be 
rational. In light of all of this, I conclude that subjective rationality is both a personal and 
societal goal.
 The next issue that has to addressed is whether or not subjective rationality is an 
appropriate goal. Intuitively, being rational is appropriate. However, one might object that 
being subjectively rational won’t always meet my criteria of appropriateness because 
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 22
complying with rational requirements can mean, under certain circumstances, one does 
some pretty awful (or imprudent) things.22
 While I can’t explore and defend this here, it could be that rational requirements 
are best understood as having wide scope and, as such, there are multiple ways to comply  
with them such that they don’t necessarily entail that one do something awful (or 
imprudent).23 Either way, I take this worry to be more about the scope of rational 
requirements than about the appropriateness of subjective rationality as a goal. Since this 
objection fails and it isn’t clear that our intuitions about the appropriateness of being 
subjectively rational are corrupt, I conclude that subjective rationality is an appropriate 
goal such that it can rightly be considered an achievement. But before moving on, I want 
to consider one more objection to what I have argued so far.
 Objection. One might agree that we set as a goal be rational but do so for 
instrumental reasons and, thus, not for the sake of rationality itself. Therefore, subjective 
rationality isn’t the kind of thing that we have intrinsic reason to pursue or care about.
 Response. As I showed earlier, one can have all kinds of instrumental reasons for 
setting something up as a goal. But this doesn’t mean that that same thing, when 
understood as an achievement, can’t also be valuable for its own sake. So, for example, 
my being subjectively rational is an achievement since it’s a personal (and societal) goal 
and my cognitive abilities are a salient causal feature in me meeting that goal. Subjective 
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23 For more on the scope of rational requirements in general and a defense of the wide scope view see John 
Brunero’s, “The Scope of Rational Requirements” Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010):28-49. See also his 
“Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope” Philosophical Studies 157 (2012): 125-140. Admittedly, 
my understanding of achievements lends itself more naturally to a wide-scope view of rational 
requirements.
rationality is, for me, an instance of a more general valuable kind—it’s an instance of the 
kind ACHIEVEMENT. And as an achievement, being subjectively rational is valuable for 
its own sake.
Against Claim 2
So far I have provided a plausible argument to the affect that we have reason, in general, 
to comply with rational requirements for their own sake. First, I argued that if doing 
something constitutes something of at least pro tanto final value then that is, ceteris 
paribus, a reason to do it. Second, I argued that subjective rationality (i.e. complying with 
rational requirements because of one’s relevant abilities) is an achievement (on 
Achievement). Third, I argued for the intuitively plausible idea that achievements have 
pro tanto final value. On account of all this, I conclude that we have, in general, reason to 
comply with rational requirements for their own sake. Thus, Claim 1 is false.
 But now it becomes necessary to respond to Claim 2. I still need to provide a 
plausible response to Kolodny’s challenge that even if we have a reason, in general, to 
comply with rational requirements for their own sake, that fact doesn’t entail that we have 
that same reason in particular cases. I think Kolodny’s challenge can be met. 
 If my Value Argument is sound then the answer to Kolodny’s challenge is 
straightforward. In any particular situation in which one’s φ-ing would constitute 
something of final value (e.g. an achievement), then one would have reason to φ for its 
own sake. So, for example, imagine that Jones has the relevant abilities needed to win a 
basketball tournament. If he set out to win the basketball tournament and did, in fact, win 
the tournament because of exercising his basketball abilities, it follow that his winning 
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the basketball tournament is an achievement. And if it’s right that achievements have 
final value, his winning the basketball tournament would constitute something that has 
value for its own sake. And, again, if my Value Argument is sound, Jones has reason to 
win the basketball tournament for its own sake.
 Of course, the value of Jones’s winning the basketball tournament and his reason 
to win the basketball tournament could be outweighed by other considerations. For 
example, both the value of winning the tournament and his reason to win the tournament 
could be outweighed if he had reason not to win the tournament, say, because if he did, an 
innocent person would be killed. But this doesn’t mean that Jones has no reason to win 
the basketball tournament. He has some reason to win it, namely, because it’s an 
achievement24. And this is true even in cases where that particular reason is outweighed 
by other considerations.
 In a similar way, I want to suggest that one has reason to comply with rational 
requirements for their own sake even when that reason is outweighed by other 
considerations because doing so constitutes something that is finally valuable-—it 
constitutes an achievement. Thus, Claim 2 is false.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued (contra Kolodny) that we have, in general, a reason to comply  
with rational requirements for their own sake. First, I argued that if doing something 
would produce (or, constitute) something of at least pro tanto final value, then that is, 
ceteris paribus, a reason to do it. Second, I argued that being subjectively rational (i.e. 
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insignificant when compared with his reason not to win the tournament.
complying with rational requirements because of one’s relevant abilities) is an 
achievement. Third, I argued that achievements have pro tanto final value. Therefore, in 
general, we have reason to comply with rational requirements for their own sake. I then 
went on to argue that not only do we have reason to comply with rational requirements in 
general, rather, we have the same reason to comply with them in particular cases and for 
their own sake. If all of this is right then I have made a significant, but modest, step 
toward refuting Niko Kolodny’s claim that we don’t have intrinsic reason to comply with 
rational requirements for their own sake. Further, I have provided a positive argument 
that explains why we have an intrinsic reason to comply with rational requirements for 
their own sake.
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 26
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bradford, Gwendolyn. “Achievements”. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2007.
Bridges, Jason. “Rationality, Normativity, and Transparency.” Mind 118 (2009): 353-367.
Broome, John. “Normative Practical Reasoning.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
 Supplementary Volume 75 (2001): 175-193.
Brunero, John. “The Scope of Rational Requirements.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60 
 (2010): 28-49.
—. “Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope.” Philosophical Studies 157 (2012): 
 125-140.
Greco, John. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic 
 Normativity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
James, Luarence. “Achievement and The Meaningfulness of Life.” Philosophical Papers 
 34 (2005): 429-442. 
Kolodny, Niko. “Why Be Rational?” Mind 114 (2005): 509-563.
Parfit, Derek. On What Matters (Volume 1). Oxford University Press, 2011.
Pritchard, Duncan. “Achievements, Luck and Value.” Think 25 (2010): 1-12.
Raz, Joseph. Engaging Reason: On The Theory of Value and Action. Oxford University 
 Press, 2002. 
Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe To Each Other. Harvard University Press, 2000. 
Sharif, Eldar and Robyn LeBeouf. “Rationality.” Annual Review of Psychology 53 
 (2002): 491-517.
Schroeder, Mark. Slaves of The Passions. Oxford University Press, 2007.
Neal, Michael L., 2012, UMSL, p. 27
